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AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE:
JUSTICE STEVENS’ LAST
TWINKLING OF AN EYE
Katherine Kaso-Howard*
I. INTRODUCTION
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League1 was deemed
to be the most important sports case in history.2 Sports lawyers and
commentators alike worried that a win for the National Football
League (NFL) would further erode antitrust laws and greatly change
the business of professional football.3 If the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision, holding that the NFL,
National Football League Properties (NFLP), and the thirty-two NFL
teams constituted a single entity for purposes of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act4 (“Section 1”5), the NFL would essentially become

* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; M.A., California State University
Dominguez Hills; B.A., University of Southern California. First, I would like to thank Professor
David W. Kesselman for his guidance and support, as well as for teaching a great Antitrust
course. Second, I would like to thank Elena De Coste Grieco, Brigitte Mills, and all the members
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their input on this Comment. Last, I am grateful to
my family, especially my husband, for keeping me motivated.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Zach Lowe, American Needle: Expect a Draw, AMLAW DAILY (Jan. 13,
2010),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/01/needleargument.html;
Michael
McCann, Why American Needle–NFL Is Most Important Case in Sports History, SI.COM (Jan. 12,
2010), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/americanneedlev.nfl/
index.html.
3. Drew Brees, The NFL Shouldn’t Call All the Plays, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2010, at B02
(“The gains we fought for and won as players over the years could be lost, while the competition
that runs through all aspects of the sport could be undermined.”).
4. Ch. 647, 29 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).
5. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 of the act makes it illegal for any “person [to]
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations . . . .” Id. § 2.
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immune from Section 1 enforcement, and anyone attempting to
negotiate with the giant entity would have little bargaining ability.6
Fortunately for the players and others who must deal with the
NFL, the Supreme Court denied Section 1 immunity and remanded
the case to the lower court for application of the rule of reason: an
evaluation of factors to determine whether the NFL’s challenged
conduct was anticompetitive or procompetitive.7 This was not
remarkable because courts favor applying the rule of reason in most
cases, particularly those related to sports.8 What is remarkable,
however, is the introduction of what this author deems the
“procompetitive quick look” analysis. Under the Court’s prior quicklook analysis, full balancing of competitive and anticompetitive
effects is unnecessary when the challenged activity presents such an
obvious anticompetitive effect that anyone with a “rudimentary
understanding of economics”9 can identify the negative impact.10
When a plaintiff can show anticompetitive effects, quick-look
analysis tends to favor the plaintiff because the court presumes the
restraint is unreasonable unless and until the defendant shows
procompetitive justifications for the restraint.11 Currently, the courts
have not explicitly employed a comparable presumption for
defendants. However, in American Needle, Justice Stevens planted
the seed for the development of a procompetitive quick-look
analysis, which could lead to an antitrust-enforcement paradigm that
is more favorable to defendants.
6. See Brees, supra note 3. From broadcasting deals alone, the NFL earns more revenue
than the gross domestic product of more than fifty countries. Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further
Review: How NFL Network Is Violating the Sherman Act, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 3 (2009).
7. Under the rule of reason, courts assess whether the challenged conduct unreasonably
restrains trade or “merely regulates and . . . thereby promotes competition.” Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
8. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively
applies rule of reason analysis . . . .”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99–100 (1984);
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 833 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The jury was
properly instructed to analyze the alleged restraints under the rule of reason . . . .”); Worldwide
Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 388 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir.
2004) (applying rule of reason).
9. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
10. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 99–100; Fara Daun, Comment, The Content
Shop: Toward an Economic Legal Structure for Clearing and Licensing Multimedia Content, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 215, 261 (1996).
11. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1993).
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Part II of this Comment presents the facts, procedural history,
and reasoning of the Court’s opinion in American Needle. Part III
provides an overview of the traditional standards to evaluate antitrust
claims under the Sherman Act. Part IV then argues that Justice
Stevens suggested an even more deferential evaluation standard—the
procompetitive quick look—and examines how this standard could
be applied to antitrust enforcement under Section 1.
II. AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
A. The Facts
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two
professional football teams.12 Each team is individually owned and
operated with its own name, logo, and colors.13 For the first fortythree years of the NFL’s existence, each individual team made its
own arrangements for intellectual property licensing.14 In 1963, the
NFL formed the NFLP to collectively develop, license, and market
the individual teams’ intellectual property.15 Between 1963 and 2000,
a variety of vendors had nonexclusive licenses with NFLP to
manufacture and sell apparel with team names, colors, and logos.16
American Needle, Inc. (ANI) was one such manufacturer. In 2000,
team owners voted to allow the NFLP the power to grant exclusive
licenses, in the hopes of increasing then-waning merchandise
revenue.17 In 2001, Reebok won a ten-year exclusive license to
manufacture and sell trademarked apparel, including headwear, for
all thirty-two teams; as a result, the NFLP did not renew ANI’s
nonexclusive license.18

12. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. John Gibeaut, A League of Their Own: The NFL Wants to Run Up the Score on Its
Antitrust Exemption, 96 A.B.A. J. 19, 20 (2010).
18. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207; see also Gibeaut, supra note 17, at 20 (“By the end of
2002, sales had increased 21 percent, to $1.1 billion. . . . [F]itted caps that sold for $19.99 before
the deal rose to $30 by 2006.”).
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B. The Lower Courts’ Decisions
ANI filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that
the agreements between the thirty-two teams, the NFL, the NFLP,
and Reebok, Inc. (collectively “the defendants”) violated both
Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.19 ANI only challenged
the 2000 agreement between the NFL and Reebok and did not
dispute the NFLP’s legitimacy as a joint venture.20
At the district court, the NFL argued that Section 1’s threshold
requirement—the existence of an arrangement that is a contract,
combination, or conspiracy between two or more actors—was not
met because the defendants were essentially one entity, and thus
could not conspire.21 Single-entity status would grant complete
immunity from Section 1 enforcement to agreements between the
teams and the NFL.22 Ultimately, the defendants’ arguments
persuaded the district court, which granted summary judgment for
the defendants because the teams had “so integrated their operations
that they should be deemed to be a single entity rather than joint
ventures cooperating for a common purpose.”23
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court.24
Acknowledging that a sports league can constitute a single entity for
antitrust purposes in some contexts but not in others, the court
focused on the conduct at issue—licensing of teams’ intellectual
property.25 The Seventh Circuit found that through the NFLP “only
one source of economic power controls the promotion of NFL
football; it makes little sense to assert that each individual team has
19. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal for any
“person [to] monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
20. Brief for the NFL Respondents at 10–11, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (No. 08-661).
Independently owned franchises in a professional sports league can be separate entities engaged
in a joint venture. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2009). A “joint venture” is an
association of independent entities that collaborate in a single business venture for joint profit. Id.
Joint ventures are subject to Section 1 and are often analyzed under the rule of reason. Texaco
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st
Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388–90
(9th Cir. 1984).
21. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2204; Brief for the NFL Respondents, supra note 20, at 8.
22. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207.
23. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
24. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d 130
S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
25. Id.
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the authority, if not the responsibility, to promote the jointly
produced NFL football.”26 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that the defendants should be deemed a single entity
for Section 1 purposes.27
C. Holding and Reasoning
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a unanimous
opinion reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court found that
the agreement to grant an exclusive license for all thirty-two teams’
intellectual property necessarily required a combination of
independent decision makers and, therefore, the defendants did not
constitute a single entity for Section 1 purposes.28 On review, the
Supreme Court limited the issue to
whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a
“contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy” as defined by
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or, as we have
sometimes phrased it, whether the alleged activity by the
NFL respondents “must be viewed as that of a single
enterprise for purposes of § 1.”29
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stevens first noted that
whether concerted action exists is a “functional consideration” of
how the parties actually operate, instead of a consideration of
whether the parties are legally distinct entities.30 The courts must
look to the nature of the concerted action and its practical impacts on
business.31 Justice Stevens further explained that the term “single
entity” is somewhat misleading because the inquiry is not simply
whether the defendant “is a legally single entity or has a single
name.”32 Rather a joint venture’s ability to defend its arrangement
depends on whether, through the venture, “separate economic actors
pursu[e] separate economic interests” such that the agreement
“deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decision

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 743.
Id. at 744.
Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2214–16.
Id. at 2208 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).
Id. at 2209.
Id.
Id. at 2211.
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making . . . and thus of actual or potential competition.”33 The
substance of a given joint venture or agreement determines the
answer to this question, not its form or legal status.34
In rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s holding that joint decisions
regarding the licensing of intellectual property were immune from
Section 1, the Court first noted that each team is independently
owned and managed with necessarily separate corporate
motivations.35 Although it acknowledged that some cooperation is
necessary to produce professional football, it recognized that the
teams still compete “not only on the playing field” but also for fans,
players, and coaches.36 Specifically at issue in American Needle,
teams compete in the intellectual property market because a team’s
profit-maximizing goal, and not the NFL’s common interest,
motivates each team to license its property.37 Unlike scheduling
games or coordinating the annual draft, the teams did not need to
abrogate their independent power to license intellectual property in
order for the league to function.38 As such, this cooperation did not
warrant treatment as a single entity’s independent action.39
Next, the Court rejected the defendants’ argument that NFLP
was immune from Section 1 just because of NFLP’s independent
legal status and separate management.40 Although agreements within
a single firm warrant a presumption that divisions of the firm all
work toward one goal—the firm’s profit maximization—NFLP
presented a “close[] question” and ultimately a “rare case” in which
the presumption did not hold.41 When entering licensing agreements,
NFLP was a mere instrumentality of the teams because thirty-two
different teams, each competing for individual profit maximization
and not collective profit, controlled NFLP’s conduct.42 Because the
agreement between NFLP and Reebok prevented each team from
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 2212 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2212–13.
Id.
Id. at 2214.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2215.
Id.
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negotiating its own licenses, the Court found that the agreement
clearly denied the market of independent decision makers.43
Therefore, the Court ruled that the teams’ joint decision to grant
exclusive licenses to Reebok constituted concerted action subject to
Section 1.44
In closing, Justice Stevens noted that the special nature of the
professional sports industry provides some justification for
agreements between the teams and the league.45 If restraints on trade
are necessary to make a product available, the per se rules of
illegality do not apply.46 Instead the conduct will be analyzed under
the “flexible Rule of Reason.”47
III. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
A. Standards of Evaluation Under the Sherman Act
Section 1 prohibits “[e]very contract . . . in restraint of
trade . . . .”48 This language, however, cannot be interpreted literally
because all contracts or combinations restrain trade to some degree.49
Accordingly, Section 1 prohibits only those contracts or
combinations that are “unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions.”50 To determine whether a restraint of trade is
unreasonably restrictive under Section 1, courts use three main types
of analyses: the rule of reason, per se, and quick look.51
1. Rule of Reason
Absent horizontal price-fixing or group boycotts,52 the default
analysis courts use is the rule of reason.53 Under the rule of reason,
43. Id. at 2214–15.
44. Id. at 2216.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
49. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
50. Id.
51. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668–69 (3d Cir. 1993).
52. Horizontal price-fixing occurs when competitors agree to tamper with the prices of
goods or services. 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 13.01 (2d ed. 2010). Horizontal group boycotts, also known as concerted refusals
to deal, are combinations of companies at the same level of distribution whose purpose is to
exclude a direct competitor from the market. Id. § 12.02(d).
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courts inquire whether the restraint at issue promotes or suppresses
competition.54 Initially, the plaintiff must show that the alleged
combination or agreement produces adverse, anticompetitive effects
within the relevant product and geographic markets.55 The plaintiff
may satisfy this burden by providing direct evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects, such as reduced output or increased prices,
or evidence of the defendant’s market power that leads to an
inference of anticompetitive effects.56 If the plaintiff can meet this
initial burden, the defendant must then show that the challenged
conduct promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective.57 To rebut,
the plaintiff must prove that the restraint is not reasonably necessary
to achieve the stated objective or that there are less restrictive
alternatives available to the defendant.58
2. Per Se Illegality
Under Section 1, some restraints—such as horizontal pricefixing and market-allocation agreements among competitors—are
presumed unreasonable restraints on trade “because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue.”59
These patently anticompetitive practices are considered illegal per se,
without the need to consider the possible procompetitve business
motivations behind them.60 Examples of such restraints include
horizontal agreements to boycott competitors or deny essential
services, horizontal agreements between competitors to divide
territories, and agreements between competitors to fix prices.61
53. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of
reason analysis . . . .”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
54. Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
55. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. “The relevant product market is defined as ‘those
commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes’ and may be used
as substitutes.” Korkala v. Allpro Imaging, Inc., No. 08-2712, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70727, at
*15–16, (D. N.J. Aug. 10, 2009). The geographic market is that area in which a firm produces or
sells. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §1.2 (2010).
56. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668.
57. Id. at 669.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“Per se liability is reserved for only those
agreements that are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
61. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 52, at § 12.02.
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Beyond these plainly naked restraints, courts are reluctant “to adopt
per se rules . . . where the economic impact of certain practices is not
immediately obvious.”62
3. Quick-Look analysis
In addition to the rule of reason and per se rule, courts apply an
abbreviated or quick-look rule-of-reason analysis.63 This is an
“intermediate standard” that “applies in cases where per se
condemnation is inappropriate, but where no elaborate industry
analysis is required.”64 In such cases, “an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets.”65
Quick-look analysis developed, particularly in sports cases, to
address restraints that might have otherwise served legitimate
competitive purposes or been necessary for the product to get to the
market at all.66 Due to the suspect nature of horizontal agreements,
however, even a legitimate purpose does not necessitate full rule-ofreason analysis if the agreement constitutes a naked restraint on price
or output.67
From a policy perspective, quick-look analysis strikes a balance
between competing concerns. It moves away from per se rules that
are no longer appropriate for modern, dynamic markets and
commercial relationships,68 but it also promotes judicial efficiency by
62. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669; see Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984).
64. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468
U.S. at 109; Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
65. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
66. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 101–04, 109–13 (holding that the power and
effect of the agreement did not need to be ascertained in excruciating detail and, importantly, that
there was no need to define the relevant market and determine the relevant market percentages).
67. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770 (“[Q]uick-look analysis carries the day when the
great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”).
68. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 (2007)
(“[T]he per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type
of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in
all or almost all instances under the rule of reason. [Courts] have expressed reluctance to adopt
per se rules . . . where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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avoiding lengthy rule-of-reason litigation.69 With new industries and
innovations, it is not always clear whether horizontal agreements will
inevitably result in harm to competition and consumers.70 By
applying quick-look analysis, defendants in emerging industries and
new-market entrants may be given the chance to rebut the
presumption of illegality while allowing innovation to continue
without bogging down the courts.71
Under quick-look analysis, courts have employed two
approaches. One approach more closely mirrors the per se rule in that
the court presumes competitive harm as a basis for the plaintiff’s
prima facie case unless and until the defendant can demonstrate some
procompetitive business justification.72 The other technique more
closely resembles the rule-of-reason analysis by employing a
“flexible” inquiry—examining likely anticompetitive effects, market
power, and efficiencies to the degree necessary to understand the
alleged suppression of competition.73 It can be difficult for courts and
litigants to ascertain which method of analysis should apply,
especially when the Supreme Court itself acknowledges that “there is
often no bright line separating” the different modes of analysis.74

69. Adam Weg, Note, Per Se Treatment: An Unnecessary Relic of Antitrust Litigation, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1535, 1542 (2009) (discussing the benefits of quick-look analysis).
70. See id. at 1542–44.
71. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89–90 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply
per se analysis to bundling of software because it would “create[] undue risks of error and []
deter[] welfare-enhancing innovation”).
72. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that under quicklook analysis, the competitive harm is presumed and “the defendant must promulgate some
competitive justification for the restraint” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73. 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1508c (3d ed. 2006); see also Law v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that an anticompetitive
effect is established when the plaintiff shows a horizontal price-fixing agreement); Chi. Prof’l
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls I), 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that the first step in any rule-of-reason analysis is an assessment of market power).
74. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104
n.26 (1984); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The
truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per
se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”).
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B. The Sherman Act and Sports Leagues
At a basic level, sports leagues are formed by horizontal
agreements among direct competitors.75 However, courts have
traditionally treated sports leagues’ horizontal agreements differently
than other horizontal agreements, and such agreements have not been
subject to the per se rule.76 Courts have long recognized that some
cooperation between competitors (the teams) is necessary if the
product (organized games leading to a championship) is to be
available at all.77 Both quick look and rule of reason have applied to
agreements between leagues and teams.78
For example, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma,79 although the football
television broadcasting rights of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) created horizontal price-fixing and output
limitation, the Court did not apply the per se rule.80 Rather, the Court
used the rule of reason because the horizontal restraints on
competition were essential to make the product available at all.81
Similarly, in Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,82 when
evaluating an NCAA rule limiting the annual compensation for
men’s assistant basketball coaches, the Tenth Circuit did not apply
the per se rule because some horizontal cooperation was necessary to

75. See Sports Business Cases Challenge League Power, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL,
Aug. 2010, at 26 (“Sports leagues are artificial entities made up of individual teams that choose to
join together to create what is in effect an annual tournament. They do this because they believe
that there will be more interest, and thus more potential revenue, from a tournament competition
than there would be from individual contests between teams.”).
76. E.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 100–01 (1984) (“[I]t would be
inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. . . . [W]hat is critical is that this case involves an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all.”).
77. Id. at 101; Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984).
78. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 101; Law, 134 F.3d at 1010.
79. 468 U.S. 85.
80. Id. at 101; see also James S. Arico, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma: Has the Supreme Court Abrogated the Per Se Rule of Antitrust
Analysis?, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 468–70 (1985) (discussing the erosion of the per se rule).
81. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 101; The Truncated or “Quick Look” Rule of
Reason, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/3Persepap.shtm (last modified
June 25, 2006).
82. 134 F.3d 1010.
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produce college sports.83 However, the court also determined that full
rule-of-reason analysis was unnecessary because the coaches’ salary
cap succeeded in artificially lowering the prices for coaching
services.84 With this showing, the court went directly to the question
of whether the procompetitive justifications advanced outweighed
the anticompetitive effects under quick-look analysis and concluded
that they did not.85
IV. ANALYSIS: POTENTIAL FOR A PROCOMPETITIVE QUICK LOOK
Although counted as a rare win for plaintiffs in an antitrust case
before the Supreme Court,86 American Needle may have actually
opened the door for a new method of analysis that favors defendants
with the introduction of what this author titles the “procompetitive
quick look.”87 It seems that applying the traditional per se–like quick
look—in which the court presumes anticompetitive effects—will not
be applied in joint-venture cases.88 However, Justice Stevens referred
to the quick-look analysis when he noted that “depending upon the
concerted activity in question, the Rule of Reason may not require a
detailed analysis; it ‘can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an
eye.’”89
This “twinkling of an eye” concept is not new to Section 1
analysis, but the context in which Justice Stevens employs it is novel.
First, Stevens reminded the reader that cooperation between teams
and the league may be perfectly legitimate:
Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by
antitrust law . . . . The fact that NFL teams share an interest
83. Id. at 1019.
84. Id. at 1020.
85. Id.
86. Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long Live Antitrust
Formalism! Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 369, 399
(2010) (“American Needle was the first case since 1992 that the Supreme Court resolved in favor
of a private antitrust plaintiff.”).
87. Others have recognized American Needle’s potential endorsement of a defendantfriendly quick-look analysis as well. James A. Keyte, American Needle: A New Quick Look for
Joint Ventures, ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2010, at 48, 51.
88. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006). But see supra Part III.C (discussing
quick-look analysis in sports cases).
89. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216–17 (2010) (quoting
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39
(1984)).
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in making the entire league successful and profitable, and
that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling
of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for
making a host of collective decisions . . . . In such
instances, the agreement is likely to survive the Rule of
Reason.90
This juxtaposition of the traditional quick-look—twinkling-ofan-eye—language with the potentially procompetitive justifications
for agreements among the teams introduces the potential for a
defendant to prevent a plaintiff from fully developing its cases and
instead bring an early motion for summary judgment based on the
procompetitive version of the quick-look analysis.
Generally under quick-look analysis, if the plaintiff can show
anticompetitive effects despite the defendant’s purportedly legitimate
purpose for the agreement, the court presumes the agreement
unreasonably restrains trade.91 If the defendant cannot meet its
burden of showing procompetitive justifications, under quick look
the court need not consider other factors—such as market share or
market power—that the traditional rule-of-reason analysis requires.92
But what if at the outset the defendant can show that the
procompetitive effects far outweigh any potential anticompetitive
effects—should the defendant then be entitled to a presumption
similar to the one that the plaintiff receives?
A procompetitive quick look can serve the same policy goals as
the anticompetitive quick look by allowing courts to dispose of cases
with analyses short of full-blown rule-of-reason analysis (for
example, when the plaintiff’s evidence of anticompetitive effects is
weak as compared to the defendant’s procompetitive justifications).
Because this method of analysis provides a strong presumption in
favor of defendants, application of the procompetitive quick look
could be limited to cases concerning restraints in industries in which
cooperation is inherently necessary. Under this version of quick look,
courts would presume the agreement’s legality for a defendant who
shows strong procompetitive justifications and a need to cooperate.

90. Id. at 2216 (citations omitted).
91. See supra Part III.A.3.
92. See Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Substantial market power is an
indispensable ingredient of every claim under the full Rule of Reason.”).
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The plaintiff would then have the opportunity to show any actual
negative effects on competition, and—depending on the weight of
these effects—the court could decide to end the analysis there.
For example, consider American Needle: if ANI could not show
significant and pernicious anticompetitive effects caused by the
exclusivity agreement with Reebok,93 the NFL would have the
opportunity to show that the centralized negotiations for exclusive
dealing created strong procompetitive justifications. Possible
justifications include lower transaction costs because licensees would
only have to negotiate with one party instead of striking individual
deals with each team, potentially also lowering prices for consumers;
improved quality and uniformity of merchandise; and improved
likelihood of preserving competition among the weak and strong
teams. Combined with the inherent need for cooperation to produce
professional football, a court could decide that deeper market
analysis is unnecessary to uphold the restraint.
This approach would further the Supreme Court’s goals of
limiting per se application while also avoiding protracted litigation
under the rule of reason. Essentially, by allowing courts to avoid the
difficult issue of defining the relevant market and the defendants’
market share, procompetitive quick look removes a contentious and
costly issue of fact from litigation. In the NFL example, the court
would no longer need to consider whether the NFL competes with all
media and entertainment or simply with all other professional
sports—often a difficult question to answer because each side
produces competing experts with complicated economic analyses
that can be tiresome for juries to wade through.94

93. In American Needle, ANI did present evidence that prices increased once the agreement
with Reebok went into effect. Gibeaut, supra note 17, at 20.
94. For example, as the Third Circuit reviewed in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc.,
610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010), at the district court level experts used different methods and
evidence to come to different definitions of the relevant market. Compare Expert Witness
Deposition of Andrew Zimbalist at *1, Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97851 (D. Del. Oct. 19, 2009) (No. 07-178), 2008 Depo. Trans. LEXIS 8142 (“Q. The
first conclusion you report in that paragraph is, ‘The relevant product market is the production of
top-tier men’s professional tennis.’ A. Yes.”), with Expert Witness Deposition of Johnathan
Walker, Ph.D. at *1–2, Deutscher Tennis Bund, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97851 (No. 07-178),
2008 Depo. Trans. LEXIS 8132 (“I considered my general background in sports economics and
an understanding about what a tennis event actually is, and all of those led me to conclude that
consumers have other alternatives to ATP tennis, besides ATP tennis, itself. . . . [I] came to the
conclusion that . . . there must be substitutes for tennis other than other tennis events.”). See

Spring 2011]

AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. V. NFL

1177

Although aligned with some Supreme Court goals, a
procompetitive quick look could also have a negative impact on
antitrust enforcement. First, plaintiffs already face a very steep climb
under the rule of reason. In a recent empirical study, Professor
Michael Carrier of Rutgers University School of Law found that
courts only reach balancing of the competitive effects under the rule
of reason in 2 percent of bench trials.95 In most cases courts
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims before reaching the balancing stage
of the rule of reason for want of anticompetitive effects.96 Under the
procompetitive quick look, plaintiffs’ difficulties could be further
exacerbated because they would lose the chance to develop the full
record necessary to balance all potential effects on competition and
consumers.97 Because market power in the relevant market can often
be a determinative factor in any antitrust case,98 without market
definition or examination of the defendants’ power in that market,
already difficult cases for plaintiffs would become almost
impossible. Second, taking the balancing question away from juries
greatly increases the likelihood that defendants will prevail as courts
already rarely reach the balancing stage of the rule of reason on their
own.99
V. CONCLUSION
Whether desirable or not, the possibility of some form of
procompetitive quick-look analysis is very real.100 In light of the
Supreme Court’s limitation of per se application, Carrier’s data, and
the Court’s recent history of siding with antitrust defendants, the rule
generally 1 AM. BAR. ASSOC., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 555–85 (6th ed. 2007)
(discussing courts’ varying approaches to defining relevant markets).
95. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 827, 829 (2009).
96. Id. Furthermore, even if a court conducted balancing analysis, it did so in a cursory
manner once the defendant had shown procompetitive effects. Id. at 831.
97. See id. at 828 (finding that courts dispose of 97 percent of cases under the rule of reason
for plaintiffs’ failures to show anticompetitive effects).
98. Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 600. For an example of how market power can greatly affect the
outcome of a case, compare two similar vertical-restraint cases: United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
99. Carrier, supra note 97, at 829–30.
100. See BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Mem’l Area Hosp. Ass’n, 36 F.3d 664 (7th
Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal without full rule-of-reason analysis when the alleged
anticompetitive impacts on the market were minimal).
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of reason seems to have already been severely truncated in many
cases, not just those in which plaintiffs show anticompetitive effects.
Articulation of a procompetitive quick look would further insulate
defendants from the enforcement of antitrust laws. However, by
applying a procompetitive quick look in cases involving industries in
which cooperation is necessary, courts could avoid lengthy litigation
when the defendant demonstrates increased efficiency, cost savings,
and other procompetitive benefits.

